BRIAN simulator

Spike-based theories are sometimes discarded on the basis that spike timing is not reproducible in vivo, in response to the same stimulus. I already argued that, in addition to the fact that this is a controversial statement (because for example this could be due to a lack of control of independent variables such as attentional [...]

Following on the previous post, with the analog-digital analogy often comes the idea that the relation between rates and spikes is that of an analog-digital conversion. Or spikes are seen as an analog-digital conversion from the membrane potential. I ... [More] believe this comes from the evolutionary argument that it seems that spikes appeared for fast propagation [...] [Less]

It is sometimes stated that rate-based computing is like analog computing while spike-based computing is like digital computing. The analogy comes from the fact, of course, that spikes are discrete whereas rates are continuous. But as any analogy, it has its limits. First of all, spikes are not discrete in the way digital numbers are [...]

In a previous post, I noted that the concept of neural assembly is limited by the fact that it does not represent relations. But this means that it is not possible to represent in this way a complex thing such as a car or a face. This might seem odd since many authors claim that [...]

Computational neuroscience is not only about making theories. A large part of the field is also about simulations of neural models on a computer. In fact, there is little theoretical work in neuroscience that does not involve simulations at some ... [More] stage. The epistemological status of simulations is quite interesting, and studies about it in philosophy [...] [Less]

In O’Regan’s paper about the sensorimotor theory of perception (O’Regan and Noë, BBS 2001), he uses the analogy of the “villainous monster”. I quote it in full: “Imagine a team of engineers operating a remote-controlled underwater vessel exploring ... [More] the remains of the Titanic, and imagine a villainous aquatic monster that has interfered with the control [...] [Less]

In a previous post, I criticized the notion of “neural code”. One of my main points was that information can only make sense in conjunction with a particular observer. I am certainly not the first one to make this remark: for example, it is presented in a highly cited review by deCharms and Zador (2000). [...]

In previous posts, I pointed out that there is a critical epistemological difference between the study of biological things and of physical things, due to the fact that living things have a fundamental “teleonomic project”. I described this project ... [More] as “reproductive invariance”, following the words of Jacques Monod, which is simply to say that what [...] [Less]

In my first post in this series, I described the differences between seeing and hearing. I noted that what characterizes sounds is that they are not persistent. One may say that sounds are “events”, as opposed to “objects”. I avoided this term because it is implied that an event has a definite start and end. [...]

How is it possible to learn by imitation? For example, consider a child learning to speak. She reproduces a word produced by an adult, for example “Mom”. How is this possible? At first sight, it seems like there is an obvious answer: the child tries to activate her muscles so that the sound produced is [...]